Algorithmic inference gathers new developments in the statistical inference methods made feasible by the powerful computing devices widely available to any data analyst. Cornerstones in this field are computational learning theory, granular computing, bioinformatics, and, long ago, structural probability (Fraser 1966). The main focus is on the algorithms which compute statistics rooting the study of a random phenomenon, along with the amount of data they must feed on to produce reliable results. This shifts the interest of mathematicians from the study of the distribution laws to the functional properties of the statistics, and the interest of computer scientists from the algorithms for processing data to the information they process. == The Fisher parametric inference problem == Concerning the identification of the parameters of a distribution law, the mature reader may recall lengthy disputes in the mid 20th century about the interpretation of their variability in terms of fiducial distribution (Fisher 1956), structural probabilities (Fraser 1966), priors/posteriors (Ramsey 1925), and so on. From an epistemology viewpoint, this entailed a companion dispute as to the nature of probability: is it a physical feature of phenomena to be described through random variables or a way of synthesizing data about a phenomenon? Opting for the latter, Fisher defines a fiducial distribution law of parameters of a given random variable that he deduces from a sample of its specifications. With this law he computes, for instance "the probability that μ (mean of a Gaussian variable – omeur note) is less than any assigned value, or the probability that it lies between any assigned values, or, in short, its probability distribution, in the light of the sample observed". == The classic solution == Fisher fought hard to defend the difference and superiority of his notion of parameter distribution in comparison to analogous notions, such as Bayes' posterior distribution, Fraser's constructive probability and Neyman's confidence intervals. For half a century, Neyman's confidence intervals won out for all practical purposes, crediting the phenomenological nature of probability. With this perspective, when you deal with a Gaussian variable, its mean μ is fixed by the physical features of the phenomenon you are observing, where the observations are random operators, hence the observed values are specifications of a random sample. Because of their randomness, you may compute from the sample specific intervals containing the fixed μ with a given probability that you denote confidence. === Example === Let X be a Gaussian variable with parameters μ {\displaystyle \mu } and σ 2 {\displaystyle \sigma ^{2}} and { X 1 , … , X m } {\displaystyle \{X_{1},\ldots ,X_{m}\}} a sample drawn from it. Working with statistics S μ = ∑ i = 1 m X i {\displaystyle S_{\mu }=\sum _{i=1}^{m}X_{i}} and S σ 2 = ∑ i = 1 m ( X i − X ¯ ) 2 , where X ¯ = S μ m {\displaystyle S_{\sigma ^{2}}=\sum _{i=1}^{m}(X_{i}-{\overline {X}})^{2},{\text{ where }}{\overline {X}}={\frac {S_{\mu }}{m}}} is the sample mean, we recognize that T = S μ − m μ S σ 2 m − 1 m = X ¯ − μ S σ 2 / ( m ( m − 1 ) ) {\displaystyle T={\frac {S_{\mu }-m\mu }{\sqrt {S_{\sigma ^{2}}}}}{\sqrt {\frac {m-1}{m}}}={\frac {{\overline {X}}-\mu }{\sqrt {S_{\sigma ^{2}}/(m(m-1))}}}} follows a Student's t distribution (Wilks 1962) with parameter (degrees of freedom) m − 1, so that f T ( t ) = Γ ( m / 2 ) Γ ( ( m − 1 ) / 2 ) 1 π ( m − 1 ) ( 1 + t 2 m − 1 ) m / 2 . {\displaystyle f_{T}(t)={\frac {\Gamma (m/2)}{\Gamma ((m-1)/2)}}{\frac {1}{\sqrt {\pi (m-1)}}}\left(1+{\frac {t^{2}}{m-1}}\right)^{m/2}.} Gauging T between two quantiles and inverting its expression as a function of μ {\displaystyle \mu } you obtain confidence intervals for μ {\displaystyle \mu } . With the sample specification: x = { 7.14 , 6.3 , 3.9 , 6.46 , 0.2 , 2.94 , 4.14 , 4.69 , 6.02 , 1.58 } {\displaystyle \mathbf {x} =\{7.14,6.3,3.9,6.46,0.2,2.94,4.14,4.69,6.02,1.58\}} having size m = 10, you compute the statistics s μ = 43.37 {\displaystyle s_{\mu }=43.37} and s σ 2 = 46.07 {\displaystyle s_{\sigma ^{2}}=46.07} , and obtain a 0.90 confidence interval for μ {\displaystyle \mu } with extremes (3.03, 5.65). == Inferring functions with the help of a computer == From a modeling perspective the entire dispute looks like a chicken-egg dilemma: either fixed data by first and probability distribution of their properties as a consequence, or fixed properties by first and probability distribution of the observed data as a corollary. The classic solution has one benefit and one drawback. The former was appreciated particularly back when people still did computations with sheet and pencil. Per se, the task of computing a Neyman confidence interval for the fixed parameter θ is hard: you do not know θ, but you look for disposing around it an interval with a possibly very low probability of failing. The analytical solution is allowed for a very limited number of theoretical cases. Vice versa a large variety of instances may be quickly solved in an approximate way via the central limit theorem in terms of confidence interval around a Gaussian distribution – that's the benefit. The drawback is that the central limit theorem is applicable when the sample size is sufficiently large. Therefore, it is less and less applicable with the sample involved in modern inference instances. The fault is not in the sample size on its own part. Rather, this size is not sufficiently large because of the complexity of the inference problem. With the availability of large computing facilities, scientists refocused from isolated parameters inference to complex functions inference, i.e. re sets of highly nested parameters identifying functions. In these cases we speak about learning of functions (in terms for instance of regression, neuro-fuzzy system or computational learning) on the basis of highly informative samples. A first effect of having a complex structure linking data is the reduction of the number of sample degrees of freedom, i.e. the burning of a part of sample points, so that the effective sample size to be considered in the central limit theorem is too small. Focusing on the sample size ensuring a limited learning error with a given confidence level, the consequence is that the lower bound on this size grows with complexity indices such as VC dimension or detail of a class to which the function we want to learn belongs. === Example === A sample of 1,000 independent bits is enough to ensure an absolute error of at most 0.081 on the estimation of the parameter p of the underlying Bernoulli variable with a confidence of at least 0.99. The same size cannot guarantee a threshold less than 0.088 with the same confidence 0.99 when the error is identified with the probability that a 20-year-old man living in New York does not fit the ranges of height, weight and waistline observed on 1,000 Big Apple inhabitants. The accuracy shortage occurs because both the VC dimension and the detail of the class of parallelepipeds, among which the one observed from the 1,000 inhabitants' ranges falls, are equal to 6. == The general inversion problem solving the Fisher question == With insufficiently large samples, the approach: fixed sample – random properties suggests inference procedures in three steps: === Definition === For a random variable and a sample drawn from it a compatible distribution is a distribution having the same sampling mechanism M X = ( Z , g θ ) {\displaystyle {\mathcal {M}}_{X}=(Z,g_{\boldsymbol {\theta }})} of X with a value θ {\displaystyle {\boldsymbol {\theta }}} of the random parameter Θ {\displaystyle \mathbf {\Theta } } derived from a master equation rooted on a well-behaved statistic s. === Example === You may find the distribution law of the Pareto parameters A and K as an implementation example of the population bootstrap method as in the figure on the left. Implementing the twisting argument method, you get the distribution law F M ( μ ) {\displaystyle F_{M}(\mu )} of the mean M of a Gaussian variable X on the basis of the statistic s M = ∑ i = 1 m x i {\textstyle s_{M}=\sum _{i=1}^{m}x_{i}} when Σ 2 {\displaystyle \Sigma ^{2}} is known to be equal to σ 2 {\displaystyle \sigma ^{2}} (Apolloni, Malchiodi & Gaito 2006). Its expression is: F M ( μ ) = Φ ( m μ − s M σ m ) , {\displaystyle F_{M}(\mu )=\Phi {\left({\frac {m\mu -s_{M}}{\sigma {\sqrt {m}}}}\right)},} shown in the figure on the right, where Φ {\displaystyle \Phi } is the cumulative distribution function of a standard normal distribution. Computing a confidence interval for M given its distribution function is straightforward: we need only find two quantiles (for instance δ / 2 {\displaystyle \delta /2} and 1 − δ / 2 {\displaystyle 1-\delta /2} quantiles in case we are interested in a confidence interval of level δ symmetric in the tail's probabilities) as indicated on the left in the diagram showing the behavior of
Photo-consistency
In computer vision, photo-consistency determines whether a given voxel is occupied. A voxel is considered to be photo consistent when its color appears to be similar to all the cameras that can see it. Most voxel coloring or space carving techniques require using photo consistency as a check condition in Image-based modeling and rendering applications. == Usage == 3D Volumetric Reconstruction. Image registration. Multi-view reconstruction.
NRD Cyber Security
NRD Cyber Security is a Lithuanian company that provides cybersecurity solutions, consulting, and other services. The organization specializes in CSIRT and SOC creation, modernization and training. It has helped to establish national and sectorial CSIRTs around the world, including countries, such as Bangladesh, Egypt, Bhutan, Kosovo, Malawi and others. NRD Cyber Security was found in 2013 to provide quality cybersecurity services to nations and organizations. In 2018 it was included in The Deloitte Technology Fast 50 in Europe list. In 2024 it was awarded the #98 place in MSSP Alert Top 250 world's managed security service providers. The company is a member of various cybersecurity organizations, such as Forum of Incident Response and Security Teams (FIRST), The Global Forum on Cyber Expertise (GFCE), Unicrons Lt. It is a strategic partner of The Global Cyber Security Capacity Centre (GCSCC) at University of Oxford.
Data access layer
A data access layer (DAL) is a software architectural layer that provides access to data from one or more sources, such as a relational database, NoSQL database, SQL query engine, file system, or other persistent storage. It separates client code from the details of storage systems, query execution, connection handling, and data retrieval. Data access layers are commonly used to centralize data access logic, reduce coupling between applications and data sources, and provide a consistent interface for retrieving, writing, or querying data. Depending on the system, a data access layer may be implemented as application code, a shared library, an intermediary service, or part of a broader database abstraction layer. == In application architecture == In application software, a data access layer provides a boundary between business logic or application code and the systems used to store or retrieve data. For example, a data access layer may expose methods or interfaces for retrieving, writing, or querying data while hiding details such as connection management, SQL statements, storage APIs, error handling, and result conversion. Depending on the application, the layer may return objects, records, tabular results, documents, streams, or other representations of data. A common implementation is a set of classes, functions, or methods that directly reference database queries, stored procedures, storage APIs, or other data sources. For example, instead of using commands such as insert, delete, and update throughout an application to access a specific table, methods such as registerUser or loginUser may be implemented inside the data access layer. Business logic methods from an application can also be mapped to the data access layer. Instead of making several database queries directly, an application can call a single DAL method that abstracts those database calls. Applications using a data access layer may be either dependent on or independent from a particular database server. If the data access layer supports multiple database systems, the application can use any database system that the DAL can access. In either case, the data access layer provides a centralized location for calls into the underlying data store, which can make it easier to maintain, test, or port the application to other storage systems. == Implementation patterns == A data access layer can be implemented using several patterns and technologies, including data access objects, repositories, stored procedures, query builders, database drivers, or object–relational mapping tools. These mechanisms may implement part or all of a data access layer, but are not always equivalent to the layer itself. Object–relational mapping tools are commonly used in data access layers for object-oriented applications that map records in a relational database to objects in a programming language. Other data access layers may expose lower-level database interfaces, tabular results, document-oriented data, files, streams, or protocol-level interfaces. == Use with multiple underlying data systems == A data access layer may be used to abstract differences between multiple underlying data systems, allowing applications to access them through a more consistent interface. In such designs, applications call the DAL rather than interacting directly with each database or storage system. The layer may then handle connection management, query generation, result mapping, error handling, and other implementation details. A data access layer may be implemented as a shared library or as an intermediary service, such as a proxy or gateway. In this configuration, client applications or services connect to the data access layer, which then communicates with one or more underlying databases or query engines. This can provide a common location for authentication, authorization, logging, routing, and translation between different database interfaces. == Interfaces and protocols == Data access layers may expose or use standardized interfaces and protocols for database access. Examples include Open Database Connectivity (ODBC), Java Database Connectivity (JDBC), database-native wire protocols, and newer interfaces such as Apache Arrow Database Connectivity (ADBC) and Arrow Flight SQL. In systems that support multiple data stores, a data access layer may provide a consistent interface while using different drivers, protocols, or query mechanisms internally. == Distinction from related patterns == A data access layer is related to, but broader than, a data access object, which is usually an object-oriented design pattern for encapsulating access to a persistence mechanism. It is also related to a database abstraction layer, which focuses on hiding differences between database systems. In practice, the terms may overlap.
Medical data breach
Medical data, including patients' identity information, health status, disease diagnosis and treatment, and biogenetic information, not only involve patients' privacy but also have a special sensitivity and important value, which may bring physical and mental distress and property loss to patients and even negatively affect social stability and national security once leaked. However, the development and application of medical AI must rely on a large amount of medical data for algorithm training, and the larger and more diverse the amount of data, the more accurate the results of its analysis and prediction will be. However, the application of big data technologies such as data collection, analysis and processing, cloud storage, and information sharing has increased the risk of data leakage. In the United States, the rate of such breaches has increased over time, with 176 million records breached by the end of 2017. By 2024, the U.S. Department of Health and Human Services reported 725 large healthcare data breaches affecting approximately 275 million individual records in a single year, marking a significant escalation in both the frequency and scale of incidents. == Black market for health data == In February 2015 an NPR report claimed that organized crime networks had ways of selling health data in the black market. In 2015 a Beazley employee estimated that medical records could sell on the black market for US$40-50. == How data is lost == Theft, data loss, hacking, and unauthorized account access are ways in which medical data breaches happen. Among reported breaches of medical information in the United States networked information systems accounted for the largest number of records breached. There are many data breaches happening in the US health care system, among business associates of the health care providers that continuously gain access to patients' data. == List of data breaches == In February 2024, a ransomware attack on Change Healthcare, a subsidiary of UnitedHealth Group, compromised the protected health information of approximately 100 million individuals, making it the largest healthcare data breach in United States history. The attack disrupted claims processing for healthcare providers nationwide for several weeks. In May 2024, MediSecure suffered a cyberattack involving ransomware in Australia. In May 2021, the Health Service Executive in the Republic of Ireland was the victim of a cyberattack involving ransomware, in the Health Service Executive cyberattack, with admission records and test results present in a sample of the data reviewed by the Financial Times. In October 2018, the Centers for Medicare and Medicaid Services in the US reported that around 75,000 individual records had been affected by a data breach that took place through the ACA Agent and Broker Portal. In 2018, Social Indicators Research published the scientific evidence of 173,398,820 (over 173 million) individuals affected in USA from October 2008 (when the data were collected) to September 2017 (when the statistical analysis took place). In 2015, Anthem Inc. lost data for 37 million people in the Anthem medical data breach In 2014 4.5 million people using Complete Health Systems had their data stolen In 2013-14 1 million people using Montana Department of Public Health and Human Services had their data stolen In 2013 4 million people using Advocate Health and Hospitals Corporation had their data stolen In 2011 4.9 million users of Tricare services had their data stolen due to an employee error by Science Applications International Corporation In 2011 1.9 million people using Health Net had their data stolen In 2011 1 million people using Nemours Foundation had their data stolen In 2010 6800 people using New York-Presbyterian Hospital and Columbia University Medical Center had their data breached. In response, those organizations agreed to pay the United States Department of Health and Human Services a US$4.8 million dollar fine. In 2009 1 million people using BlueCross BlueShield of Tennessee had their data stolen == Regulation == In the United States, the Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act and Health Information Technology for Economic and Clinical Health Act require companies to report data breaches to affected individuals and the federal government. Under the HIPAA Breach Notification Rule, covered entities must notify affected individuals without unreasonable delay and no later than 60 days after discovering a breach of unsecured protected health information. Breaches affecting 500 or more individuals must also be reported to the HHS Secretary and to prominent media outlets serving the affected state or jurisdiction within the same timeframe; HHS publicly lists these larger breaches on its breach portal, commonly known as the "wall of shame." Breaches affecting fewer than 500 individuals are reported to HHS annually, no later than 60 days after the end of the calendar year in which they were discovered. Health Information Privacy Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act of 1996 (HIPAA). - 45 CFR Parts 160 and 164, Standards for Privacy of Individually Identifiable Health Information and Security Standards for the Protection of Electronic Protected Health Information. HIPAA includes provisions designed to save health care businesses money by encouraging electronic transactions, as well as regulations to protect the security and confidentiality of patient information. The Privacy Rule became effective April 14, 2001, and most covered entities (health plans, health care clearinghouses, and health care providers that conduct certain financial and administrative transactions electronically) had until April 2003 to comply. This security provision became effective April 21, 2003. The Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA) is the baseline set of federal regulations governing medical information. It does three things: i. i. i.Establish a structure for how personal health information is disclosed and establish the rights of individuals with respect to health information; ii.Specify security standards for the retention and transmission of electronic patient information; iii.Need a common format and data structure for the electronic exchange of health information. California-Specific Laws California’s medical privacy laws, primarily the Confidentiality of Medical Information Act (CMIA), the data breach sections of the Civil Code, and sections of the Health and Safety Code, provide HIPAA-like protections, although the terminology is different. HIPAA establishes a federal "minimum standard" that applies where there are gaps in California law, and HIPAA also specifies that stricter state laws will override or supersede HIPAA. California's health care privacy laws apply to providers who provide personal health records (PHR), while HIPAA only applies when the provider providing the PHR is a business associate of a covered entity. Federal law does not grant individuals the right to file a lawsuit in the event of a data breach (only the Attorney General can file a lawsuit), but California law does. This means that California law sets a higher standard for medical privacy, and that individuals in California enjoy stronger legal protections and more ways to hold entities that violate their medical privacy accountable. In the UK, the legal framework for how patient data is cared for and processed is the Data Protection Act 2018 (DPA), which incorporates the EU General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR) into law, and the common law duty of confidentiality (CLDC). The data protection legislation requires that the collection and processing of personal data be fair, lawful and transparent. This means that the collection and processing of data as defined by data protection legislation must always have a valid lawful basis and must also meet the requirements of the CLDC. In the China, Article 18 of the "National Health Care Big Data Standards, Security and Services Management Measures (for Trial Implementation)" (National Health Planning and Development (2018) No. 23) promulgated by the National Health Care Commission in 2018 states, "The responsible unit shall adopt measures such as data classification, important data backup, and encryption authentication to guarantee the security of health care big data." However, the scope and definition of important data are not covered. Although the "Information Security Technology-Healthcare Data Security Guide" (the "Guide") issued by the National Standardization Committee also proposes that important data should be evaluated and approved in accordance with the regulations, there is likewise no definition of the connotation and definition of important data.
North Atlantic Population Project
The North Atlantic Population Project (NAPP) is a collaboration of historical demographers in Britain, Canada, Denmark, Germany, Iceland, Norway, and Sweden to produce a massive census microdata collection for the North Atlantic Region in the late-nineteenth century. The database includes complete individual-level census enumerations for each country, and provides information on over 110 million people. This large scale allows detailed analysis of small geographic areas and population subgroups. The NAPP database is designed to be compatible with the Integrated Public Use Microdata Series (IPUMS), and is disseminated through the IPUMS data-access system at the Minnesota Population Center, University of Minnesota. Major collaborators on the project include Lisa Dillon, University of Montreal; Chad Gaffield, University of Ottawa; Ólöf Garðarsdóttir, Statistics Iceland; Marianne Jarnes Erikstad, University of Tromsø; Jan Oldervall University of Bergen; Evan Roberts, University of Minnesota; Steven Ruggles, University of Minnesota; Kevin Schürer, UK Data Archive; Gunnar Thorvaldsen, University of Tromsø; and Matthew Woollard, UK Data Archive. The project is also coordinated by the Minnesota Population Center at the University of Minnesota.
Log shipping
Log shipping is the process of automating the backup of transaction log files on a primary (production) database server, and then restoring them onto a standby server. This technique is supported by Microsoft SQL Server, 4D Server, MySQL, and PostgreSQL. Similar to replication, the primary purpose of log shipping is to increase database availability by maintaining a backup server that can replace a production server quickly. Other databases such as Adaptive Server Enterprise and Oracle Database support the technique but require the Database Administrator to write code or scripts to perform the work. Although the actual failover mechanism in log shipping is manual, this implementation is often chosen due to its low cost in human and server resources, and ease of implementation. In comparison, SQL server clusters enable automatic failover, but at the expense of much higher storage costs. Compared to database replication, log shipping does not provide as much in terms of reporting capabilities, but backs up system tables along with data tables, and locks the standby server from users' modifications. A replicated server can be modified (e.g. views) and is therefore unsuitable for failover purposes.